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      ABSTRACT 
 
Do jurisdictions with concentrated ownership structures require less reliance on audits as corporate 
governance mechanisms and devices? Why do concentrated ownership structures still prevail in certain 
jurisdictions which are considered to be “market based corporate governance systems”? More 
importantly, if failures and causes of recent financial crises are principally attributable to the fact that 
market based corporate governance mechanisms, such as financial regulators, are not optimally 
performing their functions, why is the role of audits still paramount in such jurisdictions? These are 
amongst some of the questions which this paper attempts to address. 
The ever increasing growth of institutional investors in jurisdictions – particularly those jurisdictions 
with predominantly concentrated ownership structures, with their increased stakes in corporate equity, 
also raises the issue of accountability and the question as regards whether increased accountability is 
fostered where institutional investors assume a greater role – as opposed to position which exists where 
increased stake of family holdings (family controlled structures) arises. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Audits As Vital Signaling Devices In Capital Markets 
The audit serves (and should serve) as a vital capital market signaling mechanism that conveys quality 
information to the markets, investors and other users of financial information, that information provided 
by the financial statements, financial reports of an enterprise, through its management, is relatively 
reliable. From this perspective, it may be asked whether accurately conveying information about the 
financial situation or position of a firm to investors, prevents or mitigates the likelihood of the occurrence 
of systemic risks. Further, would the mitigation of information asymmetries within capital markets and 
the financial industry as a whole, reduce the possibility of systemic risks occurring? 
It could be argued that conveying accurate and credible information about the financial situation of a firm 
or enterprise to its investors, could actually trigger bank runs – if the audit generates a negative signal – 
that is, if the auditor issues a qualified opinion about the financial statements. The manner whereby the 
opinion is conveyed to the investors then becomes crucial in preventing bank runs. Even timely 
information could trigger bank runs – the “when” then probably becomes as important as “how” the 
information is handled. Whilst the level of inaccuracy or accuracy of the information conveyed by audits 
certainly has its repercussions, their role in addressing information asymmetries is quite evident. If audits 
are as reliable as they should be, whether or not they generate negative or positive signals, the timeliness, 
completeness and accuracy levels of such information – as well as the manner with which such 
information is handled, will be crucial to the triggering or avoidance of systemic risks. In this sense, a 
clear link between the quality of information, informational asymmetries and systemic risks can be 
established. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Audit Quality and Concentrated Ownership Structures 
In matters relating to information asymmetries, it may appear that audits and audit quality, play a more 
vital role in capital market based dispersed ownership systems than concentrated ownership structures. 
According to Goshen and Hamdani (2013:6), „control  matters  for  entrepreneurs  because  it  allows  
them  to overcome  asymmetric  information  vis-à-vis  investors  and  pursue  their business idea in 
whatever manner they see fit, thereby securing their ability to capture the idiosyncratic value that they 
attach to their execution of their business  idea.“ 
However, as commented by Clarke and dela Rama (2008:7). …... „the belief in the disappearance of the 
control by proprietary interests of the largest corporations, is to be questioned, not only given the patterns 
of ownership holdings within and between corporations“, but also because of „the extent of interlocking 
directorships, connections with banks and other financial institutions, as well as their real owners, and 
wider networks or ownership and influence.“ 
This is further illustrated by the situation with the United States, the „archetype of the market based 
corporate governance system“, whereby it is revealed that i) 59% of listed US corporations have a 
controlling shareholder – a situation considered higher than that which exists in Japan; ii)that 36% of US 
corporations family-controlled (a situation which is similar to the position which exists in Germany, but 
higher than the situation which exists in the UK, France or Japan); and iii) that 24% of US corporations 
are controlled and managed by a family – a similar situation to that which exists in East Asia  (Clarke and 
dela Rama, 2008:7,8; Gadhoum et al: 2008, cited). 
As well as the increased role assumed by institutional investors (as opposed to individual investors), the 
controversial nature and difficulty of distinguishing between ownership and control is further illustrated 
by Clarke and dela Rama (2008:9), who highlight the fact that even though ownership and management 
may comprise of different people, they may not be separate. 
The ever increasing role of institutional investors in jurisdictions with concentrated ownership structures, 
with their increased stakes in corporate equity, also raises the issue of accountability and the question as 
regards whether increased accountability is fostered where institutional investors assume a greater role – 
as opposed to increased stake of family holdings. 
Goshen and Hamdani (2013: 4) argue that unlike diversified  minority  shareholders,  a  controlling 
shareholder „typically  shoulders  the  costs  of  being  largely  undiversified  and  illiquid.“ 
In trying to reason why the controlling shareholder chooses to retain control, they respond to this by 
adding that agency costs, „the availability of private benefits of control“, provided a key solution to this 
reasoning, since in their opinion, the controlling shareholder  could implement the dominant position to  
„consume private  benefits“ such as self-dealing transactions, the employment of family members,  at  the  
expense  of  minority  shareholders.“ 
The success, survival and resilience of many family controlled enterprises is evidenced in the U.S – as 
well as several parts of continental Europe. A factor which could be attributed to this is that such 
structures compel a higher degree of accountability than that which is typically manifested  by dispersed 
ownership structures in marked based corporate governance structures or those concentrated ownership 
structures which are largely governed by institutional investors. Such level of accountability and 
commitment to the firm also constitutes a plausible explanation for the requirement and proposals that 
management of several enterprises retain blocks of shares for a reasonable period of time – a 
demonstration of their loyalty, as well as their commitment to the interests of the firm.  
The “unlocking” and discernment of owners in complex ownership structures will certainly provide a 
means to greater fulfillment of the goals of Board independence – a key feature in jurisdictions such as 
the UK where the distinction between the Board of directors, non-executive directors and chairmen of the 
company, has become paramount – particularly since the introduction of the Cadbury Report in 1992. The 
Cadbury Report has certainly paved the way for greater reforms which have resulted in a more refined 
Combined Code of Corporate Governance – as evidenced by the Higgs Report. As well as directing 
attention to the importance of the definition of the role of the Board, the Higgs Report also accords great 
focus to the distinction between the roles of the chairman, chief executive and non-independent executive 
directors. 
METHODOLOGY 
In arriving at a conclusion, the following approach has been adopted, namely a balancing of goals and 
objectives of dispersed ownership structures against those of concentrated ownership structures. 
Furthermore, findings from the report prepared by Oxera for the European Commission,were also taken 
into consideration. 
Which Risks are Worth Bearing? Balancing Goals and Objectives of Dispersed Ownership 
Structures and Concentrated Ownership Structures 
Goshen and Hamdani (2013:30) state that: with concentrated ownership structures, investors  face  the  
risk  that  although  the  entrepreneur  will  efficiently manage  the  firm  and  realize  the  idiosyncratic  
value, there also exists the risk that commitment  to  share  residual  cash-flows  pro-rata  will be avoided 
and that private benefits of control will be eliminated.  
 
 
Should job security (a feature and goal which many concentrated ownership structures defend) preside 
over the goal of profit maximization (or the need to secure the highest dividend payouts)? Clearly there 
should be a balance between these objectives – another possible explanation for the support towards the 
move to commitments aimed at embracing wider stakeholders and corporate social responsibility. Whilst 
profits and revenues could also be channeled towards the accomplishments of corporate social goals and 
objectives, repercussions also emanate from job losses which have potentially devastating          
consequences depending on the scale of such job losses. Hence, the need to balance goals and objectives, 
however, should also be complemented by weighing the devastating impact of firms' collapses and the 
consequences of such collapses on immediate and wider stakeholders.    
Even though it has been argued by several commentators that sanctioning role played by regulatory 
bodies and financial markets in sanctioning management, constitute flaws which have contributed to the 
recent Financial Crisis, the role played by audits and auditors, however, have definitely also played a 
crucial role in contributing to many of the recent financial and corporate collapses. 
Even though joint audits (that is, mid-tier firms carrying out joint audits with Big Four firms, as a means 
of increasing their presence at international level,), has been proposed and regarded as “the priority step in 
tackling the concentration issue” (European Commission, 2011 at page 6 of 11), whether such audits can 
also facilitate greater levels of audit independence also constitutes an interesting matter. 
 
Ownership Rules of Audit Firms and Audit Market Concentration 
The focus on ownership rules of audit firms, derives not only from consequences emanating for audit 
market concentration, but also from the impact generated on auditor independence. Employee ownership, 
as well as “the resulting profit sharing amongst senior auditors” serves as good signaling mechanism of 
the quality of audit services to the market (European Commission, 2007: page 88). The importance of 
retaining audit quality is also a concern in the bid to provide greater access, expansion and entry to the 
audit market. Would the admission of more players from the mid-tier audit firms into the audit market 
generate more positive impacts and consequences for audit independence? It is certainly the case that 
increased audit concentration within the audit market certainly has consequences for audit independence 
since there is less choice and competition between the firms in the market, as well as devastating 
consequences, in respect of systemic risk, if the demise of another Big Four audit firm, should occur. 
 
According to a report prepared by Oxera for the European Commission (2007), it was highlighted that 
“the key question to be answered, is to what extent the corporate structures adopted by audit firms, 
whether driven by rules or by commercial factors, affect the market's ability to deliver a more open 
configuration that would reduce some of the concerns expressed about concentration and choice in the 
audit market.” 
 
Main findings of the Report, as illustrated under the subheadings below, are as follows: 
i ) Current ownership  rules and opportunities created by their  potential relaxation 
 That a relaxation of current ownership and/or management rules might not result in immediate 
change in ownership structures of audit firms, but that it would, however, create a real possibility 
and provide incentives – such that alternative structures might emerge over time. 
ii) Impact on access to capital  
 That there exists evidence from current literature that several aspects of the employee-owned 
corporate form of ownership adopted by audit firms are likely to increase required rates of return 
of audit firms, as well as restrict their ability to access capital initially. 
iii) Impact on entry and expansion into the market for large audits 
 That restrictions on access to capital represents one of several potential barriers to entry into the 
market for large audits and particularly, capital was found to be critical only for those firms 
seeking to expand into the market for larger audits. 
iv) Impact on auditor independence 
 That main rationale for ownership and management restrictions is related to their impact on the 
independence of auditors from potentially negative outside influences. 
RESULTS 
From the above findings, the link between audits, audit quality and audit independence can be illustrated. 
Audit quality certainly has immense and considerable consequences – particularly in matters relating to 
audit concentration and moral hazard. The significance of the exit of another “Big Four” audit cannot be 
over emphasized. Hence greater appreciation should be accorded to the contribution made by mid-tier 
audit firms, as well as their potential in facilitating more objectivity and greater independence – 
particularly where they are involved in collaborations such as joint audits. 
Mid-tier firms are able to improve audit quality and audit independence, since their  engagement, through 
joint audit collaborations with “the Big Four”, should create avenues and greater possibilities for 
mitigating incidences where stipulated mandatory audit rotation procedures are not adequately 
implemented.   
Even though present and current literature still present some inconsistencies in establishing  a conclusive 
link between the provision of non-audit services, implementation of appropriate  mandatory audit rotation 
procedures,   
and audit quality,   
it is certainly the case that over reliance on the provision of non-audit services by an audit  firm, as well as 
unduly high degree of familiarity with an audit firm (owing to inadequately implemented mandatory audit 
rotation procedures), could adversely impact audit  independence, as well as audit quality. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Partial Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Sending the Right Signals to the Market 
 
In view of cost-benefit analyses, and the possibilities that actual costs involved in rotating an audit firm 
may actually exceed the benefits to be derived, many jurisdictions have revised their approaches to 
mandatory audit firm rotation over the years. From a logical point of view, it may actually be worth 
placing greater emphasis on other threats to audit independence, namely the provision of non-audit 
services, than actually placing more emphasis on mandatory audit rotation. This would be geared towards 
the objective of focusing on providing better quality audits. In certain cases, it may actually be worth 
considering partial mandatory audit rotation, that is, changing auditors within a particular audit firm after 
a stipulated period of time – whilst retaining the audit firm – to the effect that knowledge generated from 
having worked with a client, is retained, and can be passed on, on a succession basis, through appropriate 
training programs and in-house educational requirements organized for individual auditors within a 
particular audit firm.   
 
Sending the right signal to the markets – that no firm, and certainly, no Big Four audit firm, is “too big to 
fail” is of immense importance in addressing the issue of moral hazard. In this sense, greater 
acknowledgement is to be given to mid-tier audit firms through an appreciation of their ability to 
contribute to audit quality. Whilst adequate and appropriate punitive sanctions should be directed at the 
management of a firm, audit firms and their roles in corporate collapses, constitute ever increasing focal 
points – particularly given the recent trend demonstrated by concentrated ownership structures – a move 
towards capital market based governance structures. 
Even though family owned structures are to be commended in fostering greater accountability and 
commitment, an increased trend towards the growth of institutional investors and the need for increased 
monitoring – both internally and external to the corporate structures, warrants an effective corporate 
governance device which would not only enhance greater transparency, but also facilitate greater 
disclosure within corporate structures (and particularly, complex corporate structures).     
 
The lack of adequate mandatory audit firm rotation is also a feature and element which has affected audit 
quality over the past years. Whilst it is certainly beneficial to retain the services of an audit firm for a 
certain period of time – given benefits which accrue from having acquired in-depth knowledge about the 
client firm, disadvantages could arise owing to impaired judgment and the ability to objectively approach 
a matter as independently as is expected of such an audit firm. Familiarity or an undue degree of 
familiarity with the records of a client firm, could also facilitate cover-ups and creative accounting 
practices which have been so evident from recent and previous financial crises.  
Up till 2013, there had been no requirement at European level for the mandatory rotation of audit firms – 
even though some member states had gone further than Article 42 of Directive 2006/43/EC in requiring 
mandatory audit firm rotation. This however, has changed with mandatory requirement – pursuant to a 
draft law that would “require public-interest entities such as banks, insurance firms, and listed companies 
to rotate audit firms every 14 years”(and such period could be extended to 25 years when certain 
safeguards are put into place).  Other notable features of the Draft Law also include (Tysiac, 2013): 
 Prohibition of “Big Four-only” contractual clauses that require a company’s audit to be done by 
one of the Big Four accounting firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PwC).  
 Requirement that auditors of public-interest entities (PIEs) publish audit reports according to 
international standards and provide shareholders and investors with a detailed understanding of 
what the auditor did and an overall assurance of the accuracy of the company’s accounts.  
 Prohibition of audit firms from providing non-audit services that could jeopardize independence. 
 
Proposals, legislation and efforts aimed at encouraging partnerships between Big Four audit firms and 
mid-tier firms are also welcomed, as well as external investments in mid-tier audit firms – provided that 
audit quality is retained. Reducing the audit expectations gap is another aspect which needs to be 
accorded greater focus as this would contribute immensely towards addressing informational asymmetries 
between users of information conveyed about the financial statements and reports (and principally 
stakeholders of  firms) and the management of a firm. Whilst conveying the most accurate information is 
certainly not guaranteed to ensure that bank runs will not occur, the manner in which such information is 
handled could prove crucial in averting devastating consequences of systemic risks. In this sense, the 
auditor bears the responsibility of ensuring that audits are properly carried out whilst management needs 
to ensure that such information conveyed by audits is dispersed in a manner which not only serves the 
best interests of shareholders, but that of the market as a whole.   
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